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Existing security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) suffer from two fundamental weak-
nesses. First, memory attacks have emerged as an important threat to the security of even device-
independent quantum key distribution (DI-QKD), whenever QKD devices are re-used. This type of
attacks constitutes an example of covert channels, which have attracted a lot of attention in security
research in conventional cryptographic and communication systems. Second, it is often implicitly
assumed that the classical post-processing units of a QKD system are trusted. This is a rather
strong assumption and is very hard to justify in practice. Here, we propose a simple solution to
these two fundamental problems. Specifically, we show that by using verifiable secret sharing and
multiple optical devices and classical post-processing units, one could re-establish the security of
QKD. Our techniques are rather general and they apply to both DI-QKD and non-DI-QKD.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been much interest in the subject of quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) in recent years because it
holds the promise of providing information-theoretically
secure communications based on the laws of quantum
physics [1–3]. There is, however, a big gap between the
theory [4, 5] and the practice [6–10] of QKD, and the
security of QKD implementations is seriously threatened
by quantum hacking [11–15]. To solve this problem, the
ultimate solution is device-independent (DI)-QKD [16–
19], whose security is essentially based on a loophole-free
Bell test [20, 21]. Although no experimental implementa-
tion of DI-QKD has been realised yet, the recent demon-
strations of loophole-free Bell tests [22–26] might bring
DI-QKD closer to experimental realisation.
Despite its conceptual beauty, DI-QKD is however not
foolproof. Indeed, one cannot expect that all QKD users
will have expertise in experimental quantum optics and
electronics. So, unless Alice and Bob manufacture their
own QKD devices themselves, it could be very hard for
them to guarantee that the devices are indeed honest.
For instance, it was shown in [27] that DI-QKD is highly
vulnerable to the so-called memory attacks. In this type
of attacks, a hidden memory device (planted by the eaves-
dropper, Eve, in say Alice’s setup during the manufac-
turing or initial installation of the QKD system) stores
up the key material generated in each QKD session and
then leaks this information to Eve in subsequent QKD
runs. This situation is illustrated in Fig. 1. Importantly,
such leakage of key information could be done very slowly
over many subsequent QKD runs, and thus it could be
very difficult to detect [27]. Obviously, this is a fatal
∗ mcurty@com.uvigo.es
loss of security for DI-QKD. Whenever a QKD system
is reused for subsequent QKD sessions, the security of
the keys generated in previous QKD runs might be com-
promised. This is particularly problematic in a network
setting with multiple users (who may not all be trust-
worthy) due to the impostor attack [27, 31]. Moreover,
note that in principle memory attacks could also work
for non-DI-QKD. This is so because, in practice, it could
be quite challenging to check wether or not a purchased
QKD setup contains such memory. Therefore, in the fol-
lowing, whenever we refer to a QKD system, it will be
implicitly understood that it could be either a DI-QKD
scheme or a non-DI-QKD scheme, as our results apply to
both frameworks.
Our view is that memory attacks constitute an exam-
ple of covert channels [32], which have attracted mas-
sive attention in conventional cryptography. With covert
channels, seemingly innocent communications in a pro-
tocol could leak crucial information that is fatal to its
security. One main motivation of our work is indeed
to counter covert channels, such as memory attacks, in
QKD.
Another key weakness in standard QKD security
proofs is that they all implicitly assume that the clas-
sical post-processing units are trusted. These units are
supposed to distill a secure secret key from the raw data
generated by the QKD modules by applying techniques
such as post-selection of data (or so-called sifting), pa-
rameter estimation, error correction, error verification
and privacy amplification. However, in view of the many
hardware [33–35] and software [36] Trojan Horse attacks
that have been performed recently in conventional cryp-
tographic systems, such trust is a very strong and unjus-
tified assumption. This scenario is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Indeed, hardware and software Trojans constitute today
a key threat to the security of conventional cryptographic
devices and this threat is expected to only rise with time,
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FIG. 1. Schematic representation of a memory attack against
a DI-QKD system [27]. In the i-th QKD run, Alice and Bob’s
QKD modules, QKDA and QKDB, use a quantum channel to
produce a raw key, k′Ai and k
′
Bi, as well as certain protocol
information, pAi,info and pBi,info, respectively. The content
of pAi,info and pBi,info depends on the particular QKD proto-
col implemented. For instance, in the standard decoy-state
BB84 scheme [28–30], pA,info contains the basis and the decoy
setting information per emitted signal, while pB,info contains
Bob’s measurement basis and it also indicates which signals
produced a click in his measurement apparatus. The raw key
and the protocol information is sent to Alice and Bob’s classi-
cal post-processing units, CPA and CPB, which are connected
via an authenticated classical channel. These units generate
a secret key, kAi and kBi, by applying various post-processing
techniques. In a memory attack, Eve hides a memory in say
Alice’s module QKDA to first store up the key material gen-
erated in each QKD run and then leak this information to
her by hiding it in say the decision of abort or not abort of
a subsequent QKD session. For example, if a particular bit
value, say the j-th bit, of the key generated in the first QKD
run is 0, then this memory makes that a permuted σ(j)-th
QKD run aborts. (Here, σ is a permutation and σ(j) is the
permuted value of j.) This could be achieved, for instance,
by outputting a raw key with a high quantum bit error rate
(QBER). And, if the j-th bit value of the key is 1, then the
σ(j)-th QKD run does not abort. That is, by simply learn-
ing whether or not the σ(j)-th QKD round has aborted, Eve
could obtain the j-th bit value of the first QKD session key.
Alternatively, Eve might also leak the key material produced
in a certain QKD round by simply hiding it in the public
discussion of subsequent QKD runs. We refer the reader to
Ref. [27] for more details. Memory attacks are a fundamental
threat to the security of DI-QKD.
so it cannot be neglected when analysing the security of
a QKD implementation.
And so the key question is: how do we address covert
channels and prove security in QKD with untrusted clas-
sical post-processing units? The existence of memory at-
tacks in DI-QKD shows that quantum mechanics alone is
not enough. Clearly, we need to include some additional
assumptions. To solve this problem, we draw inspiration
from the idea of verifiable secret sharing (VSS) [39, 40]
and the existence of secure multiparty computations [41]
in conventional cryptography, where it is known that one
can achieve information-theoretic security in a n-party
cryptographic setup if the number of cheaters is less than
n/3 [42–44].
Standard VSS schemes, however, assume that all chan-
nels are classical, so by using error correction and authen-
tication techniques one can basically make these chan-
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FIG. 2. Schematic representation of a hardware/software
Trojan Horse attack against a QKD system. In QKD, it
is commonly and implicitly assumed that the classical post-
processing units CPA and CPB are trusted. However, due to
the many hardware [33–35] and software [36] Trojan Horse
attacks that have been performed against conventional cryp-
tographic systems, this trust is a very strong and unjustified
assumption. For instance, Eve could modify a chip, or infect
the software with malware, to make it fail at a crucial time, or
to hide a backdoor in say Alice’s unit CPA that leaks the final
key, kAi, generated in say the i-th QKD run to her [37, 38].
Due to the complexity and fabrication costs of current chips,
these devices are typically designed by different parties, manu-
factured by an external foundry, and packaged and distributed
by separate companies. This gives Eve multiple opportunities
to meddle with the hardware. More importantly, hardware
Trojans can be very hard to detect in practice. This is so be-
cause even slight adjustments to the electrical properties of a
few transistors (from the billions of them contained in today’s
chips) could already compromise the security. Also, Eve could
easily bypass post-fabrication tests by crafting attack triggers
that require a sequence of unlikely events, or by altering only
a subset of the chips in question [34, 35]. Similar arguments
apply as well to software malware. This shows the weaknesses
of the classical post-processing units. We refer the reader to
the caption of Fig. 1 for the meaning of the different elements
in this figure.
nels perfect. In contrast, in QKD, owing to the noisy
and lossy quantum channels controlled by Eve and the
quantum no-cloning theorem, to distill a final key Alice
and Bob need to apply several classical post-processing
steps to the raw data produced by the QKD modules in
a setting where both the QKD modules and the classical
post-processing units might be corrupted.
A key contribution of this paper is thus to show how,
despite these obstacles, such VSS approach could be
adapted to QKD to re-establish its security. The price
that we pay is that now Alice and Bob have to use a
redundant number of QKD modules and classical post-
processing units. Fortunately, however, with the recent
development of measurement-device-independent QKD
(MDI-QKD) [45–49] and chip-based QKD [50–52], the
cost of QKD modules might decrease dramatically over
time, see Fig. 3. So, it is not unrealistic to consider
that each of Alice and Bob could possess a few QKD
modules and classical post-processing units, each of them
purchased from a different vendor. Now, provided that
the majority of the vendors are honest and careful in the
manufacturing of their devices, it might not be entirely
unreasonable to assume that at least one pair of QKD
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FIG. 3. Schematic representation of a MDI-QKD network [45]
in which each user has multiple QKD transmitter modules
and classical post-processing units. Note that the measure-
ment devices are often the most expensive components of an
entire QKD system because single photon detection is highly
non-trivial. MDI-QKD allows measurement modules to be
totally untrusted, which means that there is no need for re-
dundant measurement modules if our proposal is employed
with MDI-QKD. The users just need to have multiple trans-
mitters and classical post-processing units, which thanks to
the development of cheap chip-based QKD systems [50–52],
we believe, could render our proposal cost effective in the fu-
ture. We remark that our approach is also fully compatible
with quantum relays and quantum repeaters.
modules is honest and the number of malicious/flawed
classical post-processing units is strictly less than one
third of the total number of them. With these assump-
tions in place, we can then apply techniques in conven-
tional multiparty secure computation to prove security
in different QKD scenarios with malicious devices. Im-
portantly, if we disregard the cost of authenticating the
classical communications, our protocols are optimal with
respect to the resulting secret key rate. Moreover, the
operations involved are based on simple functions in lin-
ear algebra such as bit-wise XOR and multiplication of
matrices. So, they are conceptually simple and easy to
implement.
II. QKD WITH MALICIOUS DEVICES
Let us start by describing the general scenario that we
consider in more detail. It is illustrated in Fig. 4(a). Alice
and Bob have n pairs of QKD modules, and, in addition,
say Alice (Bob) has s (r) classical post-processing units
at their disposal, each of them ideally purchased from
a different provider. Alice’s modules QKDAi, with i =
1, . . . , n, are connected to the classical post-processing
units CPAi′ , with i
′ = 1, . . . , s, via secure channels (i.e.,
channels that provide both secrecy and authentication).
Also, all the units CPAi′ are connected to each other
via secure channels. The same applies to Bob. Impor-
tantly, since all these secure channels are located only
within Alice and Bob’s labs, in practice they could be
implemented, for instance, by using physically protected
paths (e.g., physical wires that are mechanically and elec-
trically protected against damage and intrusion) which
connect only the prescribed devices. Furthermore, each
QKDAi is connected to its partner QKDBi via a quantum
channel, and each CPAi′ is connected to all CPBi′′ , with
i′ = 1, . . . , s and i′′ = 1, . . . , r, via authenticated classical
channels [53, 54].
Moreover, for simplicity, we shall consider a so-called
threshold active adversary structure. That is, we will
assume that up to t < n pairs of QKD modules, up
to t′ < s/3 units CPAi′ and up to t′′ < r/3 indepen-
dent units CPBi′′ could be corrupted. We say that a
pair of QKD modules is corrupted when at least one of
them is corrupted. Also, we conservatively assume that
corrupted devices do not have to necessarily follow the
prescriptions of the protocol but their behaviour is fully
controlled by Eve, who could also access all their internal
information. We refer the reader to Appendix E for the
security analysis of QKD against a general mixed adver-
sary structure [55].
The goal is to generate a composable -secure key, kA
and kB. That is, kA and kB should be identical except
for a minuscule probability cor, and say kA should be
completely random and decoupled from Eve except for a
minuscule probability sec, with cor + sec ≤  [56, 57].
Importantly, since now some QKD modules and classi-
cal post-processing units could be corrupted, the secrecy
condition also implies that kA and kB must be indepen-
dent of any information held by the corrupted devices
after the execution of the protocol. Otherwise, such cor-
rupted devices could directly leak kA and kB to Eve. Ob-
viously, at the end of the day, some parties might need
to have access to the final key, and thus one necessarily
must assume that such parties are trusted and located in
secure labs. In this regard, our work suggests that when
the classical post-processing units at the key distillation
layer are untrusted, they should not output the final key
kA and kB but they should output shares of it to the
key management layer [58, 59]. There, kA and kB could
be either reconstructed by say Alice and Bob in secure
labs, or its shares could be stored in distributed memo-
ries for later use, or they could be employed for instance
for encryption purposes via say the one-time pad. Im-
portantly, however, all the key generation process at the
key distillation layer can be performed with corrupted
devices. Also, we note that, if necessary, operations like
storage or encryption at the key management layer could
also be performed with corrupted devices by using tech-
niques from secure multiparty computation [41]. In any
4case, the actual management and storage of the shares
of kA and kB generated by the key distillation layer is
responsibility of the key management layer and depends
on the particular application.
Before we address specific scenarios in detail, let us
provide an overview of the general strategy that we follow
to achieve our goal, which uses as main ingredients VSS
schemes [39, 40, 44] and privacy amplification techniques
(see Appendix A). The former is employed to defeat cor-
rupted classical post-processing units. Indeed, given that
t′ < s/3 and t′′ < r/3, the use of VSS schemes allows to
post-process the raw keys generated by the QKD modules
in a distributed setting by acting only on raw key shares.
More importantly, this post-processing of raw key shares
can be performed such that no set of corrupted classi-
cal post-processing units can reconstruct kA and kB and,
moreover, it is also guaranteed that kA and kB is a correct
key independently of the misbehaviour of the corrupted
units which might wish to purposely introduce errors. In
this regard, a key insight of our paper is to show that,
since all the classical post-processing techniques that are
typically applied in QKD are “linear” in nature (i.e., they
involve simple functions in linear algebra such as bit-wise
XOR and multiplications of matrices), they are easily im-
plementable in a distributed setting.
Let us illustrate this point with a simple example. In
particular, let us consider, for instance, the error cor-
rection step in QKD. Here, say Bob wants to correct a
certain bit string, kB,key, to match that of Alice, which
we shall denote by kA,key. In general, this process re-
quires that both Alice and Bob first apply certain er-
ror correction matrices, MEC, to kB,key and kA,key to
obtain the syndrome information sA = MECkA,key and
sB = MECkB,key, respectively. Afterward, if sA 6= sB Bob
modifies kB,key accordingly. This process is then repeated
a few times until it is guaranteed that kB,key = kA,key
with high probability. Let us now consider again the
same procedure but now acting on shares, kAj ,key and
kBj ,key, of kA,key and kB,key respectively. That is, say
kA,key = ⊕qjkAj ,key and kB,key = ⊕qjkBj ,key, with q be-
ing the total number of shares. For this, Alice and
Bob first apply MEC to kAj ,key and kBj ,key to obtain
sAj = MECkAj ,key and sBj = MECkBj ,key, respectively,
for all j. Next, Alice sends sAj to Bob who obtains
sA = ⊕qj=1sAj and sB = ⊕qj=1sBj . This is so because
⊕qj=1sAj = ⊕qj=1MECkAj ,key = MEC ⊕qj=1 kAj ,key =
MECkA,key = sA, and a similar argument applies to sB.
Finally, if sA 6= sB Bob corrects kB,key by acting on its
shares kBj ,key. This is so because to flip certain bits in
kB,key is equivalent to flip the corresponding bits in one
of its shares kBj ,key. That is, the error correction step
in QKD can be easily performed in a distributed set-
ting by acting only on shares of kA,key and kB,key. The
same argument applies as well to the other classical post-
processing techniques in QKD, as all of them involve only
linear operations.
To defeat corrupted QKD modules, on the other hand,
we use privacy amplification techniques. Suppose, for
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FIG. 4. (a) Schematic representation of a QKD setup with
multiple QKD modules and classical post-processing units.
We assume that up to t < n pairs of QKD modules, up to
t′ < s/3 units CPAi′ and t
′′ < r/3 units CPBi′′ could be cor-
rupted. The goal is to distill shares of an -secure key, kA
and kB. In the figure, the thin red solid lines represent secure
classical channels, the thin red dashed lines denote authenti-
cated classical channels, and the blue thick dashed lines are
quantum channels. (b) General strategy to distill shares of
kA and kB. First, each pair QKDAi and QKDBi outputs a
raw key, k′Ai and k
′
Bi, together with the protocol information,
and sends them to the CP units at Alice and Bob’s side re-
spectively. From k′Ai and k
′
Bi, these units distill a supposedly
(/n)-secure key, k′′Ai and k
′′
Bi, and then concatenate these keys
to form k′A = [k
′′
A1, k
′′
A2, . . . , k
′′
An] and k
′
B = [k
′′
B1, k
′′
B2, . . . , k
′′
Bn].
Finally, the CP units apply privacy amplification to k′A and
k′B to remove the information held by the corrupted QKD
modules and obtain kA and kB. In the presence of corrupted
CP units, all these steps are realised in a distributed setting
by acting on data shares generated with a VSS scheme.
instance, that each pair of QKD modules, QKDAi and
QKDBi, output a raw key, k
′
Ai and k
′
Bi. Moreover, sup-
pose for the moment that the classical post-processing
units are trusted and they distill a supposedly (/n)-
secure key, k′′Ai and k
′′
Bi, of length N bits from each pair
k′Ai and k
′
Bi. Then, we have that the n × N bit strings
k′A = [k
′′
A1, . . . , k
′′
An] and k
′
B = [k
′′
B1, . . . , k
′′
Bn] are for cer-
tain cor-correct. The secrecy condition, however, only
holds if all the QKD modules are trusted. If say the pair
QKDAi′ and QKDBi′ is corrupted then the key strings
k′′Ai′ and k
′′
Bi′ are compromised. So, given that t < n the
classical post-processing units can apply privacy amplifi-
cation to k′A and k
′
B to extract two shorter (n − t) × N
bit strings, kA and kB, which are for certain sec-secret
and thus -secure. In the presence of untrusted classical
post-processing units, this process can be performed in a
distributed manner by acting on data shares, just as we
5  
QKDA1
kA kB
  
. . .
CPB  
. . .
. . .
QKDAn
QKDB1
QKDBn
k'A1 pA1,info
k'An pAn,info
k'B1 pB1,info
k'Bn pBn,info
CPA  Classical 
Channel
Quantum 
Channel
Quantum 
Channel
Alice Bob 
FIG. 5. QKD with malicious QKD modules and honest classi-
cal post-processing units. Alice and Bob have n pairs of QKD
modules, and up to t < n of them could be corrupted. Alice’s
(Bob’s) i-th QKD module is supposed to generate a raw key
k′Ai (k
′
Bi) and the protocol information pAi,info (pBi,info), with
i = 1, . . . , n. Also, they have one classical post-processing
unit each, which is assumed to be honest. The goal is to dis-
till an -secure key, kA and kB. This can be achieved by using
Protocol 1. See the main text for further details.
describe above.
In short, the general strategy can be decomposed in
three main steps, which are illustrated in Fig. 4(b). First,
each pair of QKD modules generates a raw key and the
protocol information and sends them to the CP units.
Then, in a second step, the CP units distill a supposedly
(/n)-secure key from each raw key received and concate-
nate the resulting keys to form a longer key bit string.
Finally, in the third step, the CP units apply privacy am-
plification to remove the information that could be known
to Eve due to the presence of corrupted QKD modules.
Importantly, if the CP units are untrusted, all these steps
are performed in a distributed setting by acting on data
shares produced by a VSS scheme.
Next we evaluate three different scenarios of practical
interest in this context. For concreteness, in these ex-
amples we use the VSS scheme introduced in [44] and
described in Appendix A.
A. QKD with malicious QKD modules and honest
classical post-processing units
We begin by analysing the situation where Alice and
Bob have n pairs of QKD modules and up to t < n
of them could be corrupted, and each of Alice and Bob
has one classical post-processing unit which is assumed
to be honest. This scenario is illustrated in Fig. 5 and
corresponds to the case s = r = 1 and t′ = t′′ = 0 in
Fig. 4(a).
A possible solution to this scenario is rather simple.
It is given by Protocol 1 below, which consists of three
main steps.
Protocol 1:
1. Generation of raw keys and protocol information:
Each pair QKDAi and QKDBi outputs, respec-
tively, the bit strings k′Ai and pAi,info, and k
′
Bi and
pBi,info, or the symbol ⊥i to indicate abort, for all
i = 1, . . . , n.
2. Generation of an cor-correct key: The units CPA
and CPB use the key distillation procedure pre-
scribed by the QKD protocol to generate an (/n)-
secure key, k′′Ai and k
′′
Bi, from each raw key pair
k′Ai and k
′
Bi, or they generate the abort symbol
⊥i, for all i = 1, . . . , n. Afterward, CPA (CPB)
concatenates the M ≤ n keys k′′Ai (k′′Bi) which
are different from ⊥i to form the bit string k′A =
[k′′A1, . . . , k
′′
AM ] (k
′
B = [k
′′
B1, . . . , k
′′
BM ]). Since the
units CPA and CPB are trusted, k
′′
Ai and k
′′
Bi are
for certain (cor/n)-correct ∀i and thus k′A and k′B
are cor-correct. The secrecy condition only holds
if all k′′Ai and k
′′
Bi originate from raw keys output
by honest QKD modules. For simplicity, we will
suppose that the length of k′′Ai and k
′′
Bi is N bits ∀i.
3. Generation of an -secure key: CPA and CPB ap-
ply a randomly selected universal2 hash function to
extract from k′A and k
′
B two shorter bit strings, kA
and kB, of length (M − t) × N bits. kA and kB
are by definition sec-secret, and thus, from step 2,
they are -secure.
Note that in step 3 of Protocol 1 we consider the
worst-case scenario where all k′′Ai and k
′′
Bi generated
by corrupted QKD modules contribute to k′A and k
′
B
respectively, as Alice and Bob cannot discard this case.
Most importantly, Protocol 1 allows Alice and Bob to
defeat covert channels such as memory attacks in QKD,
as this protocol guarantees that none of the corrupted
QKD modules can access kA or kB. Our results are
summarised in the following Claim, whose proof is direct
from the definition of Protocol 1.
Claim 1. Suppose that Alice and Bob have n pairs
of QKD modules and up to t < n of them could be
corrupted. Also, suppose that they have one trusted
classical post-processing unit each. Let M ≤ n denote
the number of pairs of QKD modules that do not abort
and whose raw key could in principle be transformed
into an (/n)-secure key, and let N bits be the length of
such supposedly secure key. Protocol 1 allows Alice and
Bob to distill an -secure key of length (M − t)×N bits.
Moreover, the re-use of the devices does not compromise
the security of the keys distilled in previous QKD runs.
Importantly, we remark that Protocol 1 is optimal with
respect to the resulting secret key rate. This is so because
of the following. If no pair of QKD modules aborts and
its raw data could in principle be transformed into a se-
cure key we have, by definition, that the maximum total
final key length is at most n×N bits. Also, we know that
up to t×N bits of such key could be compromised by the t
pairs of corrupted QKD modules. That is, the maximum
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FIG. 6. QKD with honest QKD modules and malicious clas-
sical post-processing units. Alice and Bob have one trusted
QKD module each, QKDA and QKDB, which generate, re-
spectively, the raw key k′A and k
′
B and the protocol infor-
mation pA,info and pB,info. Also, Alice (Bob) has s (r) clas-
sical post-processing units CPAi (CPBi′) with i = 1, . . . , s
(i′ = 1, . . . , r), and up to t′ < s/3 (t′′ < r/3) of these units
could be corrupted. The goal is to produce shares of an -
secure key, kA and kB, from which the final key could be re-
constructed. This can be achieved by using Protocol 2. See the
main text and Appendix B for further details. In the figure,
k′Aij (k
′
Bi′j) denotes the j-th share of k
′
A (k
′
B) which QKDA
(QKDB) sends to CPAi (CPBi′), and kAij (kBij) identifies the
j-th share of kA (kB) that is produced by CPAi (CPBi′). Since
QKDA (QKDB) is honest, note that the shares k
′
Aij (k
′
Bij) are
equal for all i.
secure key length is at most (n−t)×N bits. Moreover, as
discussed above, if some pairs of QKD modules abort we
must necessarily assume the worst-case scenario where
they are honest. This is so because through her interac-
tion with the quantum signals in the channel, Eve could
always force honest QKD modules to abort by simply in-
creasing the resulting QBER or phase error rate. That
is, in the scenario considered it is not possible to distill
a key length greater than (M − t)×N bits.
B. QKD with honest QKD modules and malicious
classical post-processing units
We now consider the situation where Alice and Bob
have one trusted QKD module each, and Alice (Bob) has
s (r) classical post-processing units CPAi (CPBi′), with
i = 1, . . . , s (i′ = 1, . . . , r), and up to t′ < s/3 (t′′ < r/3)
of them could be corrupted. This scenario is illustrated
in Fig. 6 and corresponds to the case n = 1 and t = 0 in
Fig. 4(a).
Since now the units CPAi and CPBi′ could be mali-
cious, we aim to generate shares of an -secure key, kA
and kB. A possible solution to this scenario is given
by Protocol 2, which uses the VSS protocol introduced
in [44]. These protocols are described in Appendices A
and B respectively. Below we provide a sketch of
Protocol 2 where, for easy of presentation, we assume
r = s. It consists of six main steps.
Sketch of Protocol 2:
1. Generation and distribution of shares of raw keys
and protocol information: QKDA and QKDB out-
put, respectively, k′A and pA,info, and k
′
B and pB,info,
or the abort symbol ⊥. If the output is different
from ⊥, QKDA sends pA,info to all CPAi and uses a
VSS scheme to distribute shares of k′A between the
CPAi. Likewise, QKDB does the same with pB,info,
k′B and the units CPBi′ . Let k
′
Aij (k
′
Bi′j) be the j-th
share of k′A (k
′
B) received by CPAi (CPBi′). Next,
the CPAi and CPBi′ send to each other pA,info and
pB,info.
2. Sifting: Each CPAi uses pA,info and pB,info to ob-
tain two bit strings, kAij ,key and kAij ,est, from k
′
Aij .
kAij ,key (kAij ,est) is used for key generation (pa-
rameter estimation). Likewise, Bob’s CPBi′ do the
same with k′Bi′j .
3. Parameter estimation: The CPAi and CPBi′ use
the reconstruct protocol of a VSS scheme to obtain
the parts of k′A and k
′
B that are used for parame-
ter estimation, kA,est and kB,est, from their shares
kAij ,est and kBi′j ,est. Next, each CPAi and CPBi′
performs locally parameter estimation (e.g., they
estimate the phase error rate). If the estimated
values exceed certain tolerated values, they abort.
4. Error correction: The CPAi and CPBi′ correct the
parts of k′A and k
′
B that are used for key distillation,
kA,key and kB,key, by acting on their shares kAij ,key
and kBi′j ,key. Let kˆAij ,key and kˆBi′j ,key denote the
resulting shares of the corrected keys kˆA,key and
kˆB,key, and let leakEC bits be the syndrome infor-
mation interchanged during this step.
5. Error verification: The CPAi use the RBS scheme
(see Appendix A) to randomly select a universal2
hash function, hV, that is sent to all CPBi′ .
The CPAi (CPBi′) compute hAij = hV(kˆAij ,key)
(hBi′j = hV(kˆBi′j ,key)) of length dlog2 (4/cor)e
bits, and they use the reconstruct protocol of a VSS
scheme to obtain both a hash, hA, of kˆA,key and a
hash, hB, of kˆB,key from the shares hAij and hBi′j .
Finally, each CPAi and CPBi′ aborts if hA 6= hB.
6. Generation of shares of an -secure key: The
CPAi use the RBS scheme to randomly select a
universal2 hash function, hP, that is sent to all
CPBi′ . Each CPAi (CPBi′) obtains the shares,
kAij = hP(kˆAij ,key) (kBi′j = hP(kˆBi′j ,key)), of a key
kA (kB).
Given that t′ < MA/3 and t′′ < MB/3, where MA
(MB) denotes the number of CPAi (CPBi′) that do not
abort, we have that the final key, kA and kB, is -secure
(see Appendix B). If they wish so, Alice (Bob) can ob-
tain kA (kB) by using the reconstruct protocol of a VSS
7scheme. That is, Alice (Bob) can use majority voting to
obtain first the j-th share, kAj (kBj), of kA (kB) from
kAij (kBi′j) for all j = 1, . . . , q, and then she (he) calcu-
lates kA = ⊕qj=1kAj (kB = ⊕qj=1kBj), where q is the total
number of shares.
Our results are summarised in the following Claim,
whose proof is direct from the definition of Protocol 2:
Claim 2. Suppose that Alice and Bob have one trusted
QKD module each, and each of them has, respectively,
s and r classical post-processing units. Also, suppose
that up to t′ < s/3 of Alice’s units and up to t′′ < r/3
of Bob’s units could be corrupted. Then, if we disregard
the cost of authenticating the classical channels between
Alice and Bob’s classical post-processing units, Protocol 2
allows them to distill an -secure key of the same length
as would be possible in a completely trusted scenario.
Moreover, the re-use of the devices does not compromise
the security of the keys distilled in previous QKD runs.
We remark that if we ignore the cost of authenticating
the classical channels between the units CPAi and CPBi′ ,
Claim 2 implies directly that Protocol 2 is optimal with
respect to the resulting secret key length. Also, we refer
the reader to Appendix C for a simpler but less efficient
protocol to achieve the same task.
C. QKD with malicious QKD modules and
malicious classical post-processing units
Finally, here we consider the situation where Alice and
Bob have n pairs of QKD modules, QKDAi and QKDBi
with i = 1, . . . , n, and Alice (Bob) has s (r) classical post-
processing units CPAi′ (CPBi′′), with i
′ = 1, . . . , s (i′′ =
1, . . . , r), and up to t < n pairs of QKD modules, up to
t′ < s/3 units CPAi′ and up to t′′ < r/3 units CPBi′′
could be corrupted. This scenario is illustrated in Fig. 7
and corresponds to the most general case considered in
Fig. 4(a).
For illustrative purposes, let us discuss first a naive
protocol that fails to achieve the goal. In par-
ticular, suppose for simplicity that s = r = n,
and, moreover, we have that up to t < n groups
Gi ≡ {QKDAi,QKDBi,CPAi,CPBi} could be corrupted,
where we say that a group Gi is corrupted if at least one
of its elements is corrupted. Then, if one disregards effi-
ciency issues, a straightforward solution to this scenario
might appear to be as follows. Each Gi simply generates
a supposedly -secure key, kAi and kBi, and this key is
then considered as the i-th share of a final key, kA and kB.
That is, kA = ⊕ni=1kAi and kB = ⊕ni=1kBi. Indeed, given
that t < n, kA and kB is for certain sec-secret. However,
the main problem of this naive approach is that kA and
kB might not be correct because a corrupted Gi could
simple output kAi 6= kBi and thus kA 6= kB.
Below we provide a simple solution (Protocol 3) to the
general scenario. It builds on Protocols 1 and 2 above,
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FIG. 7. QKD with malicious QKD modules and malicious
classical post-processing units. Alice and Bob have n pairs
of QKD modules, QKDAi and QKDBi, and up to t < n of
them could be corrupted. They generate, respectively, the
raw key k′Ai and k
′
Bi and the protocol information pAi,info and
pBi,info. Also, Alice (Bob) has s (r) classical post-processing
units CPAi′ (CPBi′′) with i
′ = 1, . . . , s (i′′ = 1, . . . , r), and
up to t′ < s/3 (t′′ < r/3) of these units could be corrupted.
The goal is to produce shares of an -secure key, kA and kB,
from which the final key could be reconstructed. This can be
achieved by using Protocol 3. See the main text for further
details. In the figure, k′Ai′ij (k
′
Bi′′ij) denotes the j-th share
of k′Ai (k
′
Bi) which QKDAi (QKDBi) sends to CPAi′ (CPBi′′),
and kAi′ij (kBi′′ij) identifies the shares of kA (kB) that are
produced by CPAi′ (CPBi′′).
and it consists of three main steps.
Protocol 3:
1. Generation and distribution of shares of (/n)-
secure keys: Each pair QKDAi and QKDBi uses say
Protocol 2 to distribute shares of an (/n)-secure
key, kAi and kBi, or the abort symbol ⊥i, between
CPAi′ and CPBi′′ , respectively. Let k˜Ai′ij (k˜Bi′′ij′)
be the j-th (j′-th) share of kAi (kBi) obtained by
CPAi′ (CPBi′′). For simplicity, we will suppose that
the length of kAi and kBi is N bits for all i.
2. Generation of shares of an cor-correct key: Let ~0 be
the N -bit zero vector, and M be the number of kAi
and kBi which are different from ⊥i. Each CPAi′
defines k′′Ai′ij = [~01, . . . ,~0i−1, k˜Ai′ij ,~0i+1, . . . ,~0M ].
Likewise, the CPBi′′ form k
′′
Bi′′ij′ from k˜Bi′′ij′ .
k′′Ai′ij and k
′′
Bi′′ij′ are by definition shares of an cor-
correct key. The secrecy condition only holds if all
kAi and kBi originate from honest QKD modules.
3. Generation of shares of an -secure key: The CPAi′
use the RBS scheme (see Appendix A) to ran-
domly select a universal2 hash function, hP, that
is sent to all CPBi′′ . Each CPAi′ (CPBi′′) obtains
shares, kAi′ij = hP(k
′′
Ai′ij) (kBi′′ij′ = hP(k
′′
Bi′′ij′)),
of length (M − t)×N bits of a final key kA (kB).
8Indeed, given that t′ < MAi/3 and t′′ < MBi/3 for all
i = 1, . . . ,M , where MAi (MBi) denotes the number of
CPAi′ (CPBi′′) that do not produce ⊥i but output post-
processed shares, kAi′ij (kBi′′ij′), from kAi (kBi), then
the final key, kA and kB, is -secure. Also, Alice (Bob)
could obtain kA (kB) by using the reconstruct protocol
of a VSS (see Appendix A). That is, Alice (Bob) could
use majority voting to obtain the shares kAij and kBij′
of kA (kB) from kAi′ij (kBi′′ij′) for all i = 1, . . . ,M and
j = 1, . . . , q (j′ = 1, . . . , q′), and she (he) calculates kA =
⊕Mi=1 ⊕qj=1 kAij (kB = ⊕Mi=1 ⊕q
′
j′=1 kBij′) where q (q
′) is
the total number of shares of kAi (kBi) for each i.
Our results are summarised in the following Claim,
whose proof is direct from the definition of Protocol 3:
Claim 3. Suppose that Alice and Bob have n pairs of
QKD modules and Alice (Bob) has s (r) classical post-
processing units. Suppose that up to t < n pairs of QKD
modules, up to t′ < s/3 classical post-processing units
of Alice, and up to t′′ < r/3 classical post-processing
units of Bob could be corrupted. Let M ≤ n denote
the number of pairs of QKD modules that do not abort
and whose raw key can be transformed into a supposedly
(/n)-secure key, and let N bits be the length of such
key. Then Protocol 3 allows Alice and Bob to distill an
-secure key of length (M − t) × N bits. Moreover, the
re-use of the devices does not compromise the security of
the keys distilled in previous QKD runs.
We remark that if we disregard the cost of authen-
ticating the classical channels between Alice and Bob’s
classical post-processing units, Protocol 3 is optimal with
respect to the resulting secret key length. The argu-
ment follows directly from that used in Sec. II A, where
we showed that if the classical post-processing units
are trusted the secret key rate is upper bounded by
(M − t)×N bits. So, in the presence of corrupted classi-
cal post-processing units this upper bound also trivially
holds.
III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Security proofs of QKD assume that there are no
covert channels and the classical post-processing units
are trusted. Unfortunately, however, both assumptions
are very hard, if not impossible, to guarantee in practice.
Indeed, memory attacks [27] constitute a fundamen-
tal practical threat to the security of both DI-QKD and
non-DI-QKD. They highlight that quantum mechanics
alone is not enough to guarantee the security of prac-
tical QKD realisations but, for this, one needs to resort
to additional assumptions. Also, recent results on Trojan
Horse attacks [33–38] against conventional cryptographic
systems underline the vulnerabilities of the classical post-
processing units, and this threat is expected to only rise
with time.
In this paper we have introduced a simple solution to
overcome these two fundamental security problems and
restore the security of QKD. The price to pay is that now
Alice and Bob need to have various QKD modules and
classical post-processing units at their disposal, bought
for example from different vendors. Given that there is
at least one pair of honest QKD modules and that the
number of corrupted classical post-processing units is less
than one third of them, we have shown how VSS schemes,
together with privacy amplification techniques, could be
used to re-establish the security of QKD.
Indeed, VSS and secret sharing techniques have been
used previously in quantum information [60–62]. For in-
stance, the authors of [60, 61] proposed a quantum ver-
sion of VSS to achieve secure multiparty quantum com-
putation, while in [62] classical secret sharing schemes are
combined with QKD to achieve information-theoretically
secure distributed storage systems.
A key insight of our paper is very simple yet potentially
very useful: the typical classical post-processing in QKD
only involves operations which are “linear” in nature, and
thus they could be easily implemented in a distributed
setting by acting on data shares from say a linear VSS
scheme.
To illustrate our results, we have proposed specific pro-
tocols for three scenarios of practical interest. They as-
sume that either the QKD modules, the classical-port-
processing units, or both of them together could be cor-
rupted. Remarkably, if we disregard the cost of classical
authentication, all these protocols are optimal with re-
spect to the secret key rate. They use the VSS scheme
introduced in [44], which is very simple to implement. Its
main drawback is, however, that, for a given number of
corrupted parties, the number of shares grows exponen-
tially with the total number of parties. Nevertheless, for
a small number of parties (which is the scenario that we
are interested in QKD), the protocol is efficient in terms
of computational complexity. Also, we remark that there
exist efficient three-round VSS protocols where the com-
putation and communication required is polynomial in
the total number of parties [63]. Moreover, these schemes
use a minimum number of communication rounds [64],
and they could also be used here. It would be interesting
to further investigate the most resource efficient protocols
to be used in the QKD framework.
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9Appendix A: Secure multiparty computation toolbox
Here we briefly introduce some definitions and cryp-
tographic protocols that are used in the main text; they
are mainly taken from [41, 44].
We consider a scenario with a dealer and n parties,
and we suppose a threshold active adversary structure
where Eve can actively corrupt the dealer and up to t
of the parties. Active corruption means that Eve can
fully control the corrupted parties whose behaviour can
deviate arbitrarily from the protocol’s prescriptions. We
refer the reader to Appendix D for the modeling of more
general adversary structures. For simplicity, we assume
that all messages are binary strings and the symbol ⊕
below denotes bit-wise XOR or bit-wise addition modulo
2. We remark, however, that the the protocols below
work as well over any finite field or ring.
In this scenario, a n-out-of-q threshold secret sharing
(SS) scheme [65, 66] is a protocol that allows the dealer
to split a message m between n parties such that, if he is
honest, any group of q or more parties can collaborate to
reconstruct m but no group with less than q parties can
obtain any information about m. If n = q, this could be
achieved by splitting m into a random sum of q shares
mi. That is, one selects the first q− 1 shares mi of m at
random, and then chooses mq = m⊕m1⊕. . .⊕mq−1 [41].
A drawback of SS schemes is that they do not guar-
antee the consistency of the shares, which is essential to
assure the correctness of the keys delivered by the QKD
protocols in the main text. That is, during the recon-
struct phase of a SS scheme, corrupted parties could send
different mi to the honest parties such that they obtain
different values for m. This problem can be solved with
verifiable secret sharing (VSS) schemes [39, 40], which
distribute mi in a redundant manner such that the hon-
est parties can use error correction to obtain the correct
values. Indeed, provided that the necessary and sufficient
conditon t < n/3 is satisfied, a VSS scheme guarantees
that there exists a well-defined m that all honest parties
obtain from their shares [42–44].
The share and reconstruct protocols of a VSS scheme
satisfy three conditions. First, independently of whether
or not the dealer is honest, if the share protocol is
successful then the reconstruct protocol delivers the
same m to all the honest parties. Second, if the dealer
is honest, the value of the reconstructed m coincides
with that provided by the dealer. And third, if the
dealer is honest, the information obtained by any set of
t of less parties after the share (reconstruct) protocol is
independent of any previous information that they held
before the protocol (is just the reconstructed bit string
m). Below we present a simple VSS scheme that builds
on the q-out-of-q threshold SS protocol above [44], and
which we use in Protocols 2 and 3 in the main text.
Importantly, given that t < n/3, this scheme provides
information-theoretic security [44]. See Fig. 8 for a
graphical representation of its share and reconstruct
protocols.
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FIG. 8. Schematic representation of the share and the re-
construct protocols of the VSS scheme introduced in [44]
for the case n = 4 and t = 1. The sets σi are given by
σ1 = {P2, P3, P4}, σ2 = {P1, P3, P4}, σ3 = {P1, P2, P4} and
σ4 = {P1, P2, P3}, with Pi denoting the i-th party. In the
share protocol, the dealer uses a 4-out-of-4 SS scheme to split
the message m into shares mi, with i = 1, . . . , 4. Then, he
sends each mi over a secure channel to all parties in σi. For
instance, he sends m1 to P2, P3, and P4, and similarly for
the other shares. Afterward, all parties in σi send each other
their shares mi to check that they are indeed equal. If no
inconsistency is found then, in the reconstruct protocol, each
party sends all his shares to all the other parties over an au-
thenticated channel. Finally, each party uses majority voting
to obtain mi ∀i and then reconstructs m = ⊕4i=1mi. In the
figure, mi={x,y,z} and mi={x,y} denote, respectively, the bit
strings {mx,my,mz} and {mx,my} with x, y, z ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4},
the red solid lines represent secure classical channels (i.e.,
channels which guarantee both secrecy and authentication),
the red dashed lines are authenticated classical channels, and
the blue solid lines refer to the output of the reconstruct pro-
tocol.
Share protocol:
1. The dealer uses a q-out-of-q SS scheme to split m
into q =
(
n
n−t
)
shares mi, with i = 1, . . . , q.
2. Let {σ1, . . . , σq} denote all (n− t)-combinations of
the set of n parties. Then, for each i = 1, . . . , q,
the dealer sends mi over a secure channel (i.e., a
channel that provides secrecy and authentication)
to each party in σi. If a party does not receive his
share, he takes as default share say a zero bit string.
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3. All pairs of parties in σi send each other their shares
mi over a secure channel to check if they are indeed
equal. If an inconsistency is found, they complain
using a broadcast channel.
4. If a complaint is raised in σi, the dealer broadcasts
mi to all parties and they accept the share received.
Otherwise, the protocol aborts.
Reconstruct protocol:
1. All pairs of parties send each other their shares over
an authenticated channel.
2. Each party uses majority voting to reconstruct the
shares mi ∀i, and then obtains m = ⊕qi=1mi.
From the description above, it is guaranteed that when
the share protocol is successful (i.e., it does not abort), all
the honest parties who received the i-th share of m obtain
exactly the same bit stringmi. Also, this protocol assures
that any share mi of m is distributed to at least 2t + 1
different parties. This is so because this is the minimum
size of any set σi. This means, in particular, that, since
the number of corrupted parties is at most t, the use of a
decision rule based on majority voting in the reconstruct
protocol permits all the honest parties to obtain the same
fixed mi for all i. Moreover, it is straightforward to show
that when the dealer is honest, the reconstructed message
m is equal to his original message. Furthermore, we have
that m is only revealed to the parties once the reconstruct
phase ends. This is so because at least one bit string mi
is only shared by honest parties since there is at least one
set σi which does not contain any corrupted party. Also,
note that if a complaint is raised in a certain σi during
the share protocol, the fact that the dealer broadcast mi
to all parties does not violate secrecy. This is so because a
complaint can only occur if either the dealer is corrupted
or σi contains at least one corrupted player, hence the
adversary knew mi already.
We remark that the broadcast channel which is re-
quired in steps 3 and 4 of the share protocol can be a sim-
ulated channel. Indeed, given that t < n/3, there exist
efficient poly(n) protocols that can simulate a broadcast
channel with information-theoretic security in an optimal
number of t+ 1 communication rounds [67, 68]. Further-
more, if a physical broadcast channel is actually avail-
able, there exist efficient information-theoretically secure
VSS schemes that only require a majority of honest par-
ties (i.e., t < n/2) and which could also be used in this
context [69].
Next we present a simple scheme to generate a
common perfectly unbiased random l-bit string (RBS)
r between n parties when up to t < n/3 of them could
be corrupted. It follows directly from VSS [42–44].
For convenience, we call it the RBS protocol. We
use it to randomly select universal2 hash functions in
Protocols 2 and 3 in the main text, where we cannot
assume the existence of an external honest dealer which
provides them to the QKD devices. The RBS scheme
allows mutually untrusted parties to generate and share
random numbers through discussions.
RBS protocol:
1. Say each of the first t+ 1 parties produces locally a
random l-bit string ri and sends it to all the other
parties using the share protocol above.
2. Each party uses a broadcast channel to confirm that
they have received all their shares from the first t+1
parties. Otherwise, the protocol aborts.
3. All parties use the reconstruct protocol above to
obtain ri for all i = 1, . . . , t+ 1. Afterward, each of
them calculates locally r = ⊕t+1i=1ri.
It is straightforward to show that this protocol guar-
antees that all honest parties share a perfectly unbiased
random bit string r. The use of the share and the recon-
struct protocols of a VSS scheme assures that all honest
parties reconstruct the same ri ∀i and thus the same r.
In addition, step 2 of the protocol guarantees that the
first t+ 1 parties generate and distribute their strings ri
before knowing the strings of the other parties. More-
over, since the number of corrupted parties is at most t,
we have that at least one honest party generates a truly
random bit string ri, and thus r is also random.
Appendix B: Protocol 2
Here we present the different steps of Protocol 2 in
detail. For concreteness, whenever we refer to the share
and reconstruct protocols of a VSS scheme we mean those
presented in Appendix A, which have been introduced
in [44].
Also, to simplify the discussion, in Protocol 2 we
consider the case where pA,info and pB,info determine the
sifting procedure of the QKD scheme in a deterministic
way. That is, there is no random post-selection of data
from the raw key. In addition, we assume that Alice and
Bob do not estimate the actual QBER but they apply
error correction for a pre-fixed QBER value followed by
an error verification step. However, we remark that Pro-
tocol 2 could be adapted to cover also these two scenarios.
1. Generation and distribution of shares of raw keys
and protocol information: QKDA and QKDB ob-
tain, respectively, the raw keys k′A and k
′
B and
the protocol information pA,info and pB,info, or the
abort symbol ⊥. If the result is different from ⊥,
QKDA uses the share protocol of a VSS scheme
to create q =
(
s
s−t′
)
shares of k′A and distributes
them among the CPAi, with i = 1, . . . , s. Likewise,
QKDB creates q
′ =
(
r
r−t′′
)
shares of k′B and dis-
tributes them among the CPBi′ , with i
′ = 1, . . . , r.
Let k′Aij (k
′
Bi′j′) be the j-th (j
′-th) share of k′A
(k′B) received by CPAi (CPBi′), with j = 1, . . . , q
11
(j′ = 1, . . . , q′). Also, QKDA (QKDB) sends pA,info
(pB,info) to all CPAi (CPBi′). Since by assump-
tion QKDA (QKDB) is honest, all CPAi (CPBi′)
receive the same pA,info (pB,info) and the shares k
′
Aij
(k′Bi′j′) are equal for all i (i
′). Next, say the first
2t′′+1 CPBi′ send pB,info to all CPAi. Likewise, say
the first 2t′ + 1 CPAi send pA,info (for the detected
events) to all CPBi′ . Each CPAi (CPBi′) uses ma-
jority voting to determine pB,info (pA,info) from the
information received. Note that since by assump-
tion the number of corrupted units CPAi (CPBi′)
is at most t′ (t′′), 2t′ + 1 (2t′′ + 1) copies of pA,info
(pB,info) is enough for the honest parties to be able
to reconstruct the correct value of these bit strings
by using majority voting.
2. Sifting: Each CPAi uses pA,info and pB,info to obtain
two bit strings, kAij ,key and kAij ,est, from k
′
Aij . The
former (latter) bit string is the part of k′Aij that
is used for key generation (parameter estimation).
Likewise, Bob’s CPBi′ do the same with k
′
Bi′j′ and
obtain kBi′j ′,key and kBi′j ′,est.
3. Parameter estimation: All CPAi and CPBi′ use
the reconstruct protocol of a VSS scheme to ob-
tain both kA,est and kB,est, which are the parts
of k′A and k
′
B that are used for parameter estima-
tion. For this, they send each other their shares
kAij ,est and kBi′j ′,est, and each of them uses major-
ity voting to obtain kAj ,est and kBj ′,est for all j =
1, . . . , q and j′ = 1, . . . , q′. Afterward, they calcu-
late kA,est = ⊕qj=1kAj ,est and kB,est = ⊕q
′
j′=1kBj ′,est.
With pA,info, pB,info, kA,est and kB,est, each CPAi
and CPBi′ performs locally the parameter estima-
tion step of the protocol (e.g., they estimate the
phase error rate). If the estimated values exceed
certain tolerated values, they abort.
4. Error correction: The CPAi and CPBi′ perform er-
ror correction (for a pre-fixed QBER value) on the
parts of k′A and k
′
B that are used for key distil-
lation, which we denote by kA,key and kB,key, by
acting on their shares kAij ,key and kBi′j ′,key respec-
tively. For this, each CPAi (CPBi′) applies cer-
tain matrices MEC to kAij ,key (kBi′j ′,key) to ob-
tain sAij = MECkAij ,key (sBi′j′ = MECkBi′j ′,key).
Afterward, they use the reconstruct protocol of a
VSS scheme to guarantee that all CPBi′ obtain
sA = MECkA,key and sB = MECkB,key. That is,
all CPAi and CPBi′ first send to all the classical
post-processing units at Bob’s side the bit strings
sAij and sBi′j′ . Then, each of Bob’s CP units uses
majority voting to reconstruct locally sAj and sBj′ ,
for all j and j′, from sAij and sBi′j′ . Finally, they
obtain sA = ⊕qj=1sAj and sB = ⊕q
′
j′=1sBj′ . Next,
Bob corrects kB,key. For this, say all CPBi′ which
have the j′-th share kBi′j ′,key for a pre-fixed index
j′ = 1, . . . , q′, flip certain bits of this share depend-
ing on the actual values of sA and sB. This whole
process is repeated until the error correction pro-
cedure ends. Let kˆAij ,key and kˆBi′j ′,key denote the
shares kAij ,key and kBi′j ′,key after error correction,
and let leakEC bits be the syndrome information in-
terchanged between Alice and Bob during this step.
That is, kˆAij ,key and kˆBi′j ′,key are actually equal
to kAij ,key and kBi′j ′,key except for the bit strings
kBi′j ′,key whose bits have been flipped during error
correction.
5. Error verification: All CPAi and CPBi′ check that
the error correction step was indeed successful. For
this, the CPAi use the RBS scheme introduced
in Appendix A to randomly select a universal2
hash function, hV. Then, they compute a hash
hAij = hV(kˆAij ,key) of length dlog2 (4/cor)e bits,
and say the first 2t′ + 1 CPAi send the hash func-
tion to all CPBi′ . Bob’s CP units reconstruct the
hash function by using majority voting and then
they calculate hBi′j′ = hV(kˆBi′j ′,key). Afterward,
all CPAi and CPBi′ use the reconstruct protocol
of a VSS scheme to obtain hA = ⊕qj=1hAj and
hB = ⊕q
′
j′=1hBj′ from hAij and hBi′j′ . That is,
they send each other hAij and hBi′j′ and they use
majority voting to determine hAj and hBj′ , for all
j and j′, from hAij and hBi′j′ . Finally, each of
them checks locally whether or not hA = hB. If
they are not equal, they abort. In so doing, we
have that the bit strings kˆA,key = ⊕qj=1kˆAj ,key and
kˆB,key = ⊕q
′
j′=1kˆBj ′,key are equal except for a mi-
nuscule probability cor, where kˆAj ,key (kˆBj ′,key) are
obtained from kˆAij ,key (kˆBi′j ′,key) by using majority
voting.
6. Generation of shares of an -secure key: All CPAi
and CPBi′ extract from kˆA,key and kˆB,key the shares
of an sec-secret key, kA and kB. For this, the CPAi
use the RBS scheme to randomly select a proper
universal2 hash function, hP. Next, they obtain
kAij = hP(kˆAij ,key) and say the first 2t
′ + 1 CPAi
send hP to all CPBi′ . Bob’s CP units use major-
ity voting to determine hP from the information
received and they calculate kBi′j′ = hP(kˆBi′j ′,key).
The function hP removes Eve’s information from
kˆA,key, which includes the syndrome information
leakEC disclosed during error correction, the hash
value of length dlog2 (4/cor)e bits disclosed during
error verification, and Eve’s information about the
key according to the estimated phase error rate.
As stated in Sec. II B, when t′ < MA/3 and t′′ < MB/3,
where MA (MB) is the number of CPAi (CPBi′) that do
not abort, kAij and kBi′j′ are shares of an -secure key,
kA and kB. This is so because the condition t
′ < MA/3
(or, equivalently, s− t′− (s−MA) > 2t′) guarantees that
for all j = 1, . . . , q, there are at least 2t′ + 1 units CPAi
which send shares kAij to Alice. To see this, note that
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each share kAj , for all j, is held by s − t′ units CPAi,
and by assumption we have that at most s−MA of them
could have aborted. A similar argument applies to the
condition t′′ < MB/3.
To reconstruct kA and kB, Alice and Bob can use ma-
jority voting to obtain kAj and kBj′ from kAij and kBi′j′ ,
respectively, and afterward they calculate kA = ⊕qj=1kAj
and kB = ⊕q
′
j′=1kBj′ .
Appendix C: Alternative solution for QKD with
honest QKD modules and malicious classical
post-processing units
In this Appendix we present a conceptually simple,
although less efficient, solution than Protocol 2 for the
case where r = s.
The main idea runs as follows. First, QKDA and
QKDB perform s independent QKD sessions, each of
them is realised with a different pair of units CPAi and
CPBi to generate a supposedly (/s)-secure key, kAi and
kBi, or the abort symbol ⊥i. For easy of illustration, we
shall assume that the length of each kAi and kBi is N bits
for all i. Of course, if say CPAi and/or CPBi is corrupted
then we have that kAi and kBi could be compromised
and known to Eve. Then, in a second step, the keys kAi
and kBi are concatenated to form kˆA = [kA1, . . . , kAM ]
and kˆB = [kB1, . . . , kBM ], where M denotes the number
of keys kAi and kBi which are different from the abort
symbol. Finally, we apply error verification and privacy
amplification to kˆA and kˆB to obtain an -secure key,
kA and kB. Importantly, this last step is performed
by the classical post-processing units in a distributed
setting by acting only on shares of kˆA and kˆB. Below we
describe the different steps of the protocol in more detail.
Alternative solution to Protocol 2:
1. Generation of (/s)-secure keys: QKDA and QKDB
perform s independent QKD sessions, each of which
with a different pair of units CPAi and CPBi, with
i = 1, . . . , s, to obtain the bit strings kAi and kBi,
which are supposed to be (/s)-secure, or the abort
symbol ⊥i.
2. Distribution of shares of (/s)-secure keys: Each
CPAi sends kAi to the other classical post-
processing units at Alice’s side by using the share
protocol of a VSS scheme, and all CPAi′ confirm
to each other that they have received their shares.
Let k′Ai′ij be the j-th share of kAi received by
CPAi′ . Likewise, the units CPBi act similarly with
kBi. Let k
′
Bi′ij be the j-th share of kBi received by
CPBi′ . Each CPAi′ defines locally the bit strings
k′′Ai′ij = [~01, . . . ,~0i−1, k
′
Ai′ij ,~0i+1, . . . ,~0M ], where ~0
is the N -bit zero vector and M is the number of
keys kAi and kBi which are different from ⊥i. Like-
wise, the CPBi′ form k
′′
Bi′ij from k
′
Bi′ij .
3. Error verification: The CPAi′ use the RBS scheme
to randomly select a universal2 hash function,
hV. Then, each of them computes locally a hash
hAi′ij = hV(k
′′
Ai′ij) of length dlog2 (4/cor)e bits for
all its bit strings k′′Ai′ij , and say the first 2t
′ + 1
CPAi′ send the hash function to all CP units at
Bob’s side. Each CPBi′ reconstructs locally the
hash function by using majority voting and ob-
tains hBi′ij = hV(k
′′
Bi′ij) for all its bit strings
k′′Bi′ij . Next, all CPAi′ and CPBi′ use the recon-
struct protocol of a VSS scheme to obtain both
hA = ⊕Mi=1 ⊕qj=1 hAij and hB = ⊕Mi=1 ⊕qj=1 hBij .
That is, they send each other the bit strings hAi′ij
and hBi′ij , and each of them uses majority voting to
obtain hAij and hBij from hAi′ij and hBi′ij . Finally,
each CPAi′ and CPBi′ checks locally if hA = hB. If
they are not equal, they output the abort symbol
⊥i′ . If they are equal, they proceed to the next
step. This error verification step guarantees that
k′′A = ⊕Mi=1 ⊕qj=1 k′′Aij and k′′B = ⊕Mi=1 ⊕qj=1 k′′Bij
are equal except for a minuscule probability cor,
where k′′Aij (k
′′
Bij) denote the bit strings that could
be obtained from k′′Ai′ij (k
′′
Bi′ij) by using majority
voting.
4. Generation of shares of an -secure key: The CPAi′
use the RBS scheme to randomly select a universal2
hash function, hP, and they compute kAi′ij =
hP(k
′′
Ai′ij). Then, say the first 2t
′ + 1 CPAi′ send
hP to all CP at Bob’s side which reconstruct lo-
cally the hash function by using majority voting,
and each CPBi′ computes kBi′ij = hP(k
′′
Bi′ij). The
function hP maps each (M × N)-bit string k′′Ai′ij
(k′′Bi′ij) to a shorter bit string kAi′ij (kBi′ij) of size
(M − 2t′)×N − dlog2 (4/cor)e bits.
The reason for reducing the size of k′′Ai′ij and k
′′
Bi′ij
by 2t′ ×N bits in the last step of the protocol is due to
the following. In the worst-case scenario, we have that
all corrupted CPAi could be partnered with honest CPBi
(and vice versa). This means, in particular, that there
could 2t′ keys kAi and kBi which could be compromised
and, more importantly, Alice and Bob cannot discard
that these keys contribute to k′′Ai′ij and k
′′
Bi′ij .
Given that t′ < MAi/3 and t′′ < MBi/3 for all
i = 1, . . . ,M , where MAi (MBi) denotes the number of
CPAi′ (CPBi′) that do not produce ⊥i but output post-
processed shares, kAi′ij (kBi′ij), from kAi (kBi), then the
final key, kA and kB, is -secure. Once again, to recon-
struct it, Alice (Bob) can use majority voting to ob-
tain kAij (kBij) from kAi′ij (kBi′ij) and then calculate
kA = ⊕Mi=1 ⊕qj=1 kAij (kB = ⊕Mi=1 ⊕qj=1 kBij).
To conclude this Appendix, let us briefly compare the
solution above with that provided by Protocol 2. For this,
we first note that the approach above runs s independent
QKD sessions while Protocol 2 can distill an -secure key
from one single QKD run. The second main difference is
related to the resulting secret key rate. To simplify our
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discussion, we shall assume, like above, that the length of
each kAi and kBi is N bits for all i. After running s QKD
sessions, the alternative protocol above can deliver a final
key of length roughly ≈ (M − 2t′) ×N bits, while if we
run Protocol 2 s times the length of the final key would
be roughly s×N secret bits. That is, even if we consider
the best-case scenario for the alternative approach above
(i.e., M = s), Protocol 2 provides a secret key rate that
is ≈ s/(s − 2t′) times higher than that provided by this
alternative method.
Appendix D: General adversary structures
In the main text we have considered the security of
QKD against a so-called threshold active adversary struc-
ture. As we have already seen, active corruption means
that there could exist a central adversary, Eve, who fully
controls the behaviour of all the corrupted parties, which
do not have to necessarily follow the prescriptions of the
protocol. On the other hand, by a threshold adversary
structure we refer to an adversary who can corrupt up to
t (but not more) of the parties.
This is, however, a particular case of what is called
a general mixed adversary structure [55]. By mixed cor-
ruption we mean that some of the corrupted parties could
also be passively (in contrast to actively) corrupted. Pas-
sive corruption indicates that the parties could leak all
their information to the adversary, but otherwise they
follow all the indications of the protocol correctly. Gen-
eral adversary structures, on the other hand, refer to the
fact that the subsets that contain all the potentially cor-
rupted parties could have an arbitrary distribution, i.e.,
they do not need to consists on all possible combinations
of up to t parties.
To model the corruption capability of a general adver-
sary one can use a so-called (Σ,Ω)-adversary structure.
This is basically a set that contains all the potentially
corruptible subsets of parties. More precisely, let P de-
note the set of all parties, and let Σ and Ω be structures
for P satisfying Σ ⊆ P(P ) and Ω ⊆ Σ with P(P ) be-
ing the power set of P . Here, a structure for P means
a subset Γ of P(P ) that is closed under taking subsets.
That is, if S ∈ Γ and S′ ⊆ S then S′ ∈ Γ. Then, a
(Σ,Ω)-adversary is an adversary that can passively (ac-
tively) corrupt a set σ (ω) of parties with σ ∪ ω ∈ Σ and
ω ∈ Ω. Below, for ease of notation, whenever we describe
a structure, we only list its maximal sets. That is, it is
implicitly understood (even if it is not explicitly written)
that its subsets also belong to the structure.
Next, we introduce the share and the reconstruct pro-
tocols of a VSS scheme [44] that provides information-
theoretic security against a general (Σ,Ω)-adversary
given that P /∈ Σ unionsq Ω unionsq Ω, which can be proven to be
a necessary and sufficient condition to achieve security
in this framework [44]. That is, the VSS below is opti-
mal in this sense. Here, unionsq is an operation on structures
defined as Γ1 unionsq Γ2 = {S1 ∪ S2 : S1 ∈ Γ1, S2 ∈ Γ2}. That
is, Γ1 unionsq Γ2 is a structure that contains all unions of one
element of Γ1 and one element of Γ2. If Σ = Ω (i.e., when
all corrupted parties are active), note that the condition
P /∈ ΣunionsqΩunionsqΩ coincides with that introduced in [42, 43].
Without loss of generality, below we assume that Σ
contains q maximal sets σi, i.e., Σ = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σq}.
Share protocol:
1. The dealer uses a q-out-of-q SS scheme to split the
message m into q shares mi, with i = 1, . . . , q.
2. For each i = 1, . . . , q, the dealer sends mi over a
secure channel to each party in the set σ′i, where σ
′
i
is defined as the complement of σi. If a party does
not receive his share, he takes as default share say
a zero bit string.
3. All pairs of parties in σ′i send each other their shares
mi over a secure channel to check that their shares
are indeed equal. If an inconsistency is found, they
complain using a broadcast channel.
4. If there is a complaint in σ′i, the dealer broadcasts
mi to all parties and they accept the share received.
Otherwise, the protocol aborts.
Reconstruct protocol:
1. All parties send their shares to all other parties over
an authenticated channel.
2. Each party reconstructs locally the shares mi ∀i,
and obtains m = ⊕qi=1mi. For this, let mli be the
value for mi sent by the l-th party in σ
′
i. Then,
each party chooses the unique value mi such that
there exists a ω ∈ Ω satisfying mli = mi for all
l ∈ σ′i − ω.
As in the case of the share protocol presented in the
main text, the share protocol above also requires the
availability of a broadcast channel. Fortunately, how-
ever, in this framework it is also possible to simulate
such a channel by efficient protocols, with polynomial
message and computation complexity, between the dif-
ferent parties [70]. For this, the requirement is that
P /∈ Ω unionsq Ω unionsq Ω [44].
To conclude this Appendix, let us mention that the
simple RBS protocol described in the main text can be
straightforwardly adapted to be secure also against a gen-
eral (Σ,Ω)-adversary given that P /∈ ΣunionsqΩunionsqΩ. For this,
we only need to make two modifications. First, we re-
place the share and reconstruct protocols with the ones
described above. And, second, now we do not employ the
first t+ 1 parties Pi ∈ P to produce a random bit string
each (see step 1 of the RBS protocol in the main text).
Instead, these random bit strings are produced by all the
parties in one set ρ ∈P(P ) such that ρ * Σ. In so doing,
we guarantee that there is at least one honest party that
generates a random bit string. Here, one could take, for
instance, the set ρ with the minimum number of parties.
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Appendix E: QKD secure against general adversary
structures
Finally, here we revisit briefly the three practical sce-
narios that we have considered in the main text, and we
discuss how one could easily adapt Protocols 1, 2 and 3 to
make them secure against a (Σ,Ω)-adversary. For this,
we shall assume that the structures Σ and Ω are known
to both Alice and Bob, which is a standard assumption
in this framework.
The case of Protocol 1 is rather simple, as it does not
require any change. Since in that scenario one assumes
that the classical post-processing units CPA and CPB are
both honest, it is guaranteed that the concatenated bit
strings k′A and k
′
B are cor-correct. Also, we have that
Eve could know at most t×N bits of say k′A except with
probability sec, where the parameter t now refers to the
size of the biggest set in Σ. That is, here t denotes the
maximum number of pairs of QKD modules that can be
passively corrupted. Then, by applying a privacy ampli-
fication step to k′A and k
′
B , the units CPA and CPB can
directly extract an sec-secret key, kA and kB , of length
(M − t) × N bits. In fact, one could even use a tighter
bound here by selecting the parameter t as the maximum
size of all maximal sets in a structure Σ′ that is obtained
from Σ by removing from all of its subsets those pairs of
QKD modules which have aborted.
The case of Protocol 2, on the other hand, requires
a few minor modifications. First, now Alice and Bob
have to use the share, reconstruct, and RBS protocols
introduced above instead of the protocols presented in
the main text. This implies that the (Σ,Ω)-adversary
structure has to satisfy both in Alice and Bob’s side P /∈
ΣunionsqΩunionsqΩ to guarantee security. Second, in steps 1, 5 and
6 of Protocol 2, now we do not employ the first 2t′ + 1
(2t′′ + 1) units CPAi (CPBi′) to reveal the information
pA,info (pB,info) as well as the hash functions hV and hP.
Instead, this information is revealed by all units in one
set σ′i, where σ
′
i is again the complement of σi ∈ Σ, both
for Alice and Bob. One could take, for instance, the set
σ′i with the minimum number of parties. Afterward, the
information is reconstructed by using the second step of
the reconstruct protocol introduced above. Note that
such VSS scheme guarantees that, if all the parties in
σ′i receive the same information, this information can be
reconstructed correctly. And this is indeed guaranteed by
Protocol 2, as all units CPAi (CPBi′) obtain precisely the
same information pA,info (pB,info), hV and hP. Finally,
to reconstruct the key kA and kB from the shares kAij
and kBi′j′ , Alice and Bob now use the second step of the
reconstruct protocol introduced in Appendix D.
Finally, one could modify Protocol 3 as follows. Like in
the previous case, Alice and Bob replace the share, recon-
struct, and RBS protocols with the protocols introduced
above, given, of course, that the condition P /∈ ΣunionsqΩunionsqΩ
is fulfilled both in Alice and Bob. Also, in step 1, one
obviously uses the version of Protocol 2 described in the
previous paragraph. In addition, in step 3, one replaces
the method to announce the hash function hP with the
procedure described in the previous paragraph. More-
over, also in step 3, the parameter t that appears in the
expression of the secret key length now refers to the size
of the biggest set in Σ. That is, t is the maximum number
of pairs of QKD modules that can be passively corrupted
(or, alternatively, one can select t as the maximum size of
all maximal sets in a structure Σ′ that is obtained from
Σ by removing from all of its subsets those pairs of QKD
modules which have aborted). Finally, Alice and Bob re-
construct kA and kB by using again the second step of
the reconstruct protocol introduced above.
Similar arguments can be applied as well to the proto-
col introduced in Appendix C as alternative to Protocol 2.
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